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ABSTRACT 
Complex evolving systems, consisting of populations of varied and replicating entities are 
found in both nature and human society. There exists no alternative to the core Darwinian 
principles of variation, selection and inheritance to explain the evolution of such systems. 
Neither the actual existence of human intentionality nor the hypothetical possibility of 
Lamarckian acquired character inheritance offers a barrier to the use of Darwinian principles. 
On the contrary, Darwinism is always required to complete the explanation. However, while 
Darwinian principles are always necessary to explain complex evolving population systems 
they are never sufficient on their own. 
Why We Need a Generalized Darwinism, 





What is ‘evolution’?1 At least on etymological or historical grounds, there is little point in 
trying to give the word a narrow or well-defined meaning. Etymologically, like the word 
‘development’, ‘evolution’ derives from the Latin verb volvere. This means ‘to roll’ but it can 
refer more broadly to the general idea of motion. The companion verbs evolvere and revolvere 
are more explicit, respectively denoting forward and backward motion, as in the unrolling and 
rolling-up of a scroll. The word ‘evolution’ therefore derives from the Latin word associated 
with a specifically directional and predestined activity; the scroll is unrolled to reveal that 
which is already written within. In this spirit the word ‘evolution’ was first applied to natural 
phenomena by the German biologist, Albrecht von Haller, in 1744. He used the word to 
characterize embryological development as the augmentation and expansion of a preformed 
miniature adult organism, a common idea in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, 
in biology, the idea of preformation, where the embryo is deemed to contain in microcosm the 
form of its future development, lasted well into the nineteenth century, being embraced 
explicitly by Herbert Spencer and subtly affecting Charles Darwin’s thought (Richards 1992).  
Spencer did much more than Darwin to popularize the term ‘evolution’. In the first edition 
of the Origin of Species, Darwin did not use this word and only once wrote ‘evolved’. 
Subsequently he infrequently used the term ‘evolution,’ but on the whole he preferred phrases 
like ‘descent with modification’. Today ‘evolution’ is used in a number of senses, and there is 
little basis to claim that any one has greater legitimacy. Accordingly, no Darwinian copyright 
can be imposed on the word ‘evolution’. Furthermore, attempts to define evolution in some 
narrower and sharper sense, whether Darwinian or otherwise, are unlikely to make much 
headway. 
Instead of starting from the vague and fruitlessly contested word ‘evolution’, we prefer to 
commence from the types of phenomena involved. We refer to a broad class of systems and 
populations of entities, including all feasible manifestations of development and change. We 
then show, under some minimal conditions, that ongoing change in such systems is inevitably 
Darwinian in the sense that it must involve Darwin’s central principles of variation, 
inheritance and selection. 
It is demonstrated that this central argument can resist a number of objections. For instance, 
some authors point to the theory of self-organization and suggest that it is an alternative to 
Darwinian selection. Others point to human intentionality and claim that it is inconsistent with 
                                                 
1 The authors are very grateful to Guido Bünstorf, Christian Cordes, Peter Corning, James F. Crow, Ian Gough, 
David Hull, Joel Mokyr, Richard Nelson, Peter Richerson, Viktor Vanberg, Jack Vromen, Richard Webb, Ulrich 
Witt, anonymous referees and many others for inspiration, discussions and critical comments. This essay makes 
use of some material from Hodgson (2002). 
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the ‘blind’ processes of Darwinism. Others regard Lamarckism and Darwinism as rivals, 
seeing social evolution as an exemplification of the former rather than the latter. 
We shall argue that all these objections are mistaken in crucial respects. Processes of self-
organization are important in nature and society. Human intentionality and choice are 
distinctive and should not be ignored. It is proposed by many that the Lamarckian inheritance 
of acquired characters may occur in social evolution. But none of these propositions rules out 
Darwinism. On the contrary, all accounts require Darwinian principles to complete their 
explanations. 
We acknowledge fully that the detailed mechanisms of change are often very different, both 
within and between different types of system, in nature and in human society, but again, as 
argued below, this does not undermine a generalized Darwinian analysis.2
Much progress in broadly-defined ‘evolutionary’ thinking in the last three hundred years 
has involved the development of the insight that complex outcomes are not necessarily the 
result of deliberate design, by humans or by God. Such a theme is found in the writings of 
Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Adam Smith and Carl Menger, as Friedrich Hayek (1973, 
1988) and others have discussed extensively. All these writers pointed to the emergence of 
undesigned social orders and institutions that resulted from individual interactions.  
This was a highly significant but incomplete step. Writers such as Mandeville and Smith 
did not explain how the individuals and their dispositions had themselves evolved, and they 
gave only limited insights into why particular undesigned outcomes would survive longer 
than others and could thereby be copied or imitated. Darwin (1859) filled these gaps with his 
principle of selection. Humans who were more adapted to their environment would have a 
survival advantage over others. 
In contrast to the view that Darwinism is domain-specific, Darwin (1859, pp. 422-3; 1871, 
vol. 1, pp. 59-61, 106, 166) himself proposed that natural selection operates upon the elements 
of language and argued that tribal groups with moral and other propensities that served the 
common good would be favored by natural selection. Following this lead, other writers such 
as Walter Bagehot (1872), David Ritchie (1896) and Thorstein Veblen (1899) argued that the 
principle of selection could help explain the survival not only of individuals, but also of 
groups, customs, nations, business firms and other social institutions.3
While Mandeville, Hume, Smith and Menger had shown how undesigned social orders and 
institutions can emerge, the Darwinian social theorists showed how some but not all of them 
might survive, without presuming that their adaptedness4 was already explained. The principle 
                                                 
2 The idea of a generalized Darwinism was described by Dawkins (1983) and others subsequently as ‘Universal 
Darwinism’. We have no strong objection to this term, but it should be pointed out that the idea of applying 
Darwinism to the evolution of social entities pre-dates Dawkins’s essay by more than a century. Generalizing 
Darwinism does not itself imply any adherence to Dawkins’s other views. 
3 See Hodgson (2004) for a discussion of these and other early attempts to extend Darwinism to social evolution. 
Note that we generally use the term ‘social’ in a broad sense, to include business and other phenomena studied 
by economists. After a long period of neglect, today Darwinian ideas are widely discussed in economics and 
organizational sociology. In this essay we cite a number of leading evolutionary economists. 
4 Following a convention suggested in biology, adaptedness refers to the fitness value of a trait or trait-complex 
in a specific environment with respect to the current circumstances. By contrast, adaptation denotes the process 
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of selection provides the means of explaining adaptedness and survival, without assuming that 
the capacities to adapt and survive are given or decreed by a divine Creator. 
This paper is divided into six further sections. Section one describes the broad type of 
‘evolutionary’ system that we are required to explain and shows why Darwinian principles are 
unavoidable in dealing with such systems. Section two argues that self-organization theory is 
insufficient to explain the evolution of the complex systems discussed here and itself requires 
Darwinism to complete its explanations in such a context. Section three acknowledges that 
human intentionality is distinctive and important, but shows that it does not limit or exclude 
Darwinism. Section Four deals briefly with the issue of ‘Lamarckism’ and shows that even if 
acquired character inheritance did occur in the natural or the social world; it would not 
provide a complete evolutionary explanation. Darwinism would still be required. Section five 
gives the other side of the coin; while Darwinian principles are always necessary to explain 
complex evolving population systems, they are never sufficient on their own. Attention to 
specific, detailed mechanisms is always required. Section six concludes the essay. 
1. Complex population systems and the inevitability of Darwinism 
What kind of systems are we required to explain? Rather than simple, mechanical systems, 
the objects or our discussion are complex systems, at least in the sense that they involve a 
variety of entities that interact with one another. Such complex systems produce some 
outcomes that are not willed by any individual entity and have properties that do not 
correspond to any individual entity taken alone. 
Still retaining a high degree of generality, we may add some further details to this picture. 
The complex systems considered here involve populations of entities of specific types. 
Members of each type are similar in key respects, but within each type there is some degree of 
variation, due to genesis, circumstances or both. 
Entities within these populations have limited capacities to absorb some materials and 
energy from a sector of their environment in some manner of consumption, and they are able 
to process some information about their environment attained by the use of some sensory 
mechanisms. Beyond that, we do not need yet to go into further detail about their cognitive 
and informational capacities. These entities may or may not have a developed brain or 
memory. They may or may not be capable of reflecting on their circumstances and imagining 
past or future behaviors. 
Some further elements are necessary to complete the picture. All these entities are mortal 
and degradable, and they need to consume materials and energy in order to survive or 
minimize degradation. However, because they do not have access to all environmental 
resources at once, these entities face an omnipresent problem of local and immediate 
scarcity.5 These circumstances present specific problems that have to be solved to minimize 
                                                                                                                                                        
of becoming adapted in terms of an evolutionary history. Thus, in its present use, adaptedness refers to the 
features of organisms; adaptation (as a verb) refers to the process of becoming adapted. A second meaning of 
adaptation (as a noun) is a phenotypic adjustment to a characteristic in the environment. This use is commonly 
employed in economics and organization theory but not in biology. We shall use the term both as a verb and as a 
noun, in these respective senses. 
5 The concept of scarcity is widely assumed by economists but rarely defined or discussed in detail. When 
Robbins (1932) regarded economics as the science of choice under scarcity, he defined scarcity loosely as a 
resource that is ‘limited’. But there is a big difference between global or absolute scarcity and scarcity in a local 
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degradation and raise the chances of survival. In short, these entities are engaged in a struggle 
for existence, to use the term adopted by Darwin (1859, pp. 62-63). 
Finally, we assume some capacity to retain and pass on to others workable solutions to 
problems faced in the struggle for existence. The advantages of retaining such problem 
solutions or adaptations are obvious in avoiding the risks and labor of learning them anew. 
Given that all these entities are mortal and degradable, there are also good reasons to assume 
that some capacity to pass on to others information about such workable solutions exists.6
This is the basis of the Darwinian principle of inheritance. It refers to a broad class of 
mechanisms, including those of ‘replication’ and ‘descent’ (Mayr 1991), by which 
information concerning adaptations is retained, preserved, passed on or copied through time. 
In sum, a complex population system involves populations of non-identical (intentional or 
non-intentional) entities that face locally scarce resources and problems of survival. Some 
adaptive solutions to such problems are retained through time and may be passed to other 
entities. Examples of populations in such systems are plentiful both in nature and in human 
society. They include every biological species, from amoebas to humans. They would include 
self-replicating automata, of the type discussed by John von Neumann (1966). In addition, 
and importantly for the social scientist, they include human institutions, as long as institutions 
may be regarded as cohesive entities having some capacity for the retention and replication of 
problem solutions. Such institutions would include business firms.7
Having sketched in broad terms the type of ‘evolutionary’ system we are considering, we 
now come to the crucial step in the argument: an adequate explanation of the evolution of 
such a system must involve the three Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and 
selection.8 These are the broad Darwinian theoretical requirements. They do not themselves 
                                                                                                                                                        
and immediate sense. Many global resources are limited. However, other global and useful resources such as 
skill, trust and honor do not face the same physical constraints. The problem of scarcity is ubiquitous only with 
regard to some immediately available resources, and even then there are cases where some local resources can be 
in abundance. 
6 An adequate explanation of why information retention and replication exist in such a system would invoke 
Darwinian selection between species that varied in such capacities. Our first step here is to assume a likely type 
of complex population system rather than to explain it. It will be clear from the examples below that the type of 
complex population system that we are assuming is highly relevant for evolutionary discourse in the social 
sciences. 
7 Others may prefer to describe replicating social entities more broadly as ‘memes’ (Dawkins 1976). But the 
choice of label does not affect our general argument here. On the origin and significance of the idea of 
institutions as repositories of information see Hodgson (2004). Note also the related treatments of firms and 
routines by Nelson and Winter (1982) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2004). 
8 We fully acknowledge that the prominent conceptions of Darwinism, and how Darwinians have presented its 
message, have themselves evolved to some significant degree since 1859. Recently, for example, there has been 
acknowledgement of evolution on multiple levels and of complex interdependencies that undermine some 
previous (gene-centered) attempts at explanatory reduction (Hull 1985, Depew and Weber 1995, Keller 2002). 
Nevertheless, the three core principles of variation, inheritance and selection have endured. They are prominent 
in the long, final paragraph of the Origin (Darwin 1859). These core principles long pre-dated and existed 
independently of the 1940s synthesis of Darwinism with Mendelian genetics and the discovery of the structure of 
DNA in 1953. A generalized Darwinism essentially invokes the three core principles, not these auxiliary 
developments. 
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provide all the necessary details, but nevertheless they must be honored. Otherwise the 
explanation of the evolution will be inadequate.  
Consider the three Darwinian principles in turn. First, there must be some explanation of 
how variety occurs and how it is replenished in a population. In biological systems the 
answers here, established since Darwin’s death, involve genetic recombination and also rare 
mutations. There are no closely analogous mechanisms in the evolution of social institutions, 
but the existence and replenishment of variety remains a vital question of evolutionary 
research (Metcalfe 1998, Nelson 1991, Saviotti 1996).  
Second, there must be an explanation of how useful information concerning solutions to 
particular adaptive problems is retained and passed on. This requirement follows directly from 
our assumptions concerning the broad nature of the complex population system that we are 
required to explain, in which there must be some mechanism by which adaptive solutions are 
copied or passed on. In biology these mechanisms often involve genes and DNA. In social 
evolution we may include the replication of habits, customs, rules and routines, all of which 
may carry solutions to adaptive problems.9 There must be some mechanism that ensures that 
some such solutions (embodied in habits, routines or whatever) endure and replicate; 
otherwise the continuing retention of useful knowledge would not be possible. 
Third, and not least, there must be an explanation of the fact that entities differ in their 
longevity and fecundity. In given contexts, some entities are more adapted than others, some 
survive longer than others, and some are more successful in producing offspring or copies of 
themselves. Here the principle of selection comes in. Briefly, selection involves an anterior 
set of entities, each interacting with its environment and somehow being transformed into a 
posterior set where all members of the posterior set are sufficiently similar to some members 
of the anterior set, and where the resulting frequencies of posterior entities depend upon their 
properties in the environmental context.10 Through selection, a set of entities, a population, 
will gradually adapt in response to the criteria defined by an environmental factor. In a cold 
environment, the proportion of mammals with more fat or longer fur is likely to increase.  
This broad definition of selection is nevertheless sharp enough to distinguish itself from the 
principle of variation. The latter requires some explanation of the sources and replenishments 
of variety. Selection refers to the mechanisms that bring about the survival of some variations 
rather than others, often reducing variety. Even when both variety-creation and selection 
involve human agency, as often is the case in the human domain, the two processes are quite 
different. Innovation is about the creation of new variations; selection is about how they are 
tested in the real world.  
Note that the outcomes of a selection process are necessarily neither moral nor just. 
Furthermore, there is no requirement that outcomes of a selection process are necessarily 
optimal or improvements on their precursors. Insofar as these outcomes carry connotations of 
refinement or efficiency, it is efficiency relative to the given environment, and efficiency that 
is tolerable rather than optimal. Darwinism does not assume that selection brings about 
globally efficient or (near) optimal outcomes, and in certain instances selection can even lead 
                                                 
9 See for example, Veblen (1899, 1919), Keller (1915), Nelson and Winter (1982), Hayek (1988), Hodgson 
(2003). 
10 The technical definition of selection is explored at greater length elsewhere (Price 1995, Knudsen 2002, 
2004). 
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to systematic errors (Hodgson 1993, Hull 2001). There is no reason to believe that the special 
requirements needed to asymptote global efficiency are commonly present in nature or society 
(Gould 2002, Winter 1971). 
Without the principle of selection, we have no way of explaining how some entities or their 
offspring prevail over others. The principle is widely held to apply in the natural world; the 
fitter members of the species often have greater chances of survival and procreation. This 
helps to explain how species become adapted to their environment. But the move from the 
natural to the social world does not undermine the principle of selection. Even if there is not a 
fierce life-and-death struggle between rival customs or institutions, some explanation is 
required of why some enjoy greater longevity than others, why some are imitated more than 
others, and why some diminish and decline. Any such explanation must come under the 
general rubric of selection, as defined above. 
Darwin’s principles of variation, inheritance and selection are required not only to explain 
evolution within populations but also the origins of those populations themselves. Together, 
the three principles provide a framework for understanding speciation as well as other forms 
of evolution. 
Overall, as long as there is a population with imperfect inheritance of their characteristics, 
not all of them having the same potential to survive, then Darwinian evolution will occur. The 
following sections deal with a number of objections to the proposition. 
2. The insufficiency of self-organization theory 
The existence of self-organized, complex outcomes shows that we do not always have to look 
for a designer to explain their emergence. This insight is important in the social sciences 
because it counters the view that all social phenomena are the result of conscious design. 
Many complex and efficacious human institutions such as language and common law are not 
the outcome of an overall plan. 
Self-organization is also very important in nature. We can observe intricate patterns and 
complex outcomes that are the result of interactions and accumulated steps. Just as self-
organization reminds us that not every human creation is the result of a plan, it also removes 
the hand of God from explanations of many wonders of nature. But is self-organization 
sufficient to explain the origin of species and all complex biological phenomena? The definite 
answer is no. Darwin’s principle of selection is also required. 
Unfortunately, some writers, marveling at the outcomes of self-organization, have proposed 
that it is sufficient as an evolutionary explanation of all complex phenomena. In both biology 
and the social sciences they have thus downplayed the importance of evolutionary selection 
and the importance of the Darwinian intellectual revolution. Although he embraced much of 
Darwinism, Hayek (1973, pp. 22-23) belittled its significance with the statement: ‘Those 
eighteenth-century moral philosophers and the historical schools of law and language might 
well be described … as Darwinians before Darwin. … A nineteenth-century social theorist 
who needed Darwin to teach him the idea of evolution was not worth his salt.’ This 
underestimates the importance of the specific contribution of Darwin, especially in terms of 
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the principle of selection, and encourages others to place more emphasis on the emergence of 
undesigned social order than on the sifting and selection of rival social institutions.11
Similarly, John Foster (1997) proposes that the theory of self-organization provides a 
sufficient, general basis for evolutionary thinking in economics, and Ulrich Witt (1997, p. 
489) argues that the ‘theory of self-organization … provides an abstract, general description 
of evolutionary processes.’ 
In response, we first consider the role of self-organization in living systems. Close 
examination of their writings shows that leading proponents of self-organization in biology do 
not see it as an alternative to natural selection. 
At a very fundamental level, the self-organization of chemical hypercycles is thought to 
explain the emergence of life. Emergent chemical hypercycles provide the feedback necessary 
for the emergence of self-reproducing metabolic networks. In the absence of emergent 
hypercycles, there would be no positive feedback for growth, implying that metabolic 
networks would simply die out (Eigen and Schuster 1979, Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, 
Kauffman 1993). Once self-reproducing metabolic networks have emerged, however, a 
selection process is required for these entities to continue to increase in complexity. This is 
one of the major findings in the hypercycle literature.  
Stuart Kauffman (1993) made a powerful argument that natural selection alone cannot 
explain the origin of complex organisms. Systems involving non-linear interactions comprise 
a large number of possible states, most having little survival value. Kauffman argued that 
processes of self-organization channel systems into more restrictive possibilities by way of 
positive feedback. However, Kauffman (1993) further argued that selection sustains 
organisms of a level of complexity beyond that explained by the principles of self-
organization in isolation.  
In the absence of self-organization, there will be no emergence of self-reproducing 
organisms. In the absence of selection, however, there will be no move towards the 
emergence of increasingly complex structures. Thus, rather than being alternatives, Kauffman 
(1993, p. 465) saw a ‘natural marriage of self-organization and selection’. He and several 
other pioneers of self-organization theory do not present their argument as an alternative to 
Darwinian theory. Jeffrey Wicken (1987) wrote of ‘extending the Darwinian paradigm’, not 
exterminating it. David Depew and Bruce Weber (1995) considered ‘Darwinism evolving’, 
not Darwinism abandoned. Weber and Depew (1996, p. 51) wrote: 
the very concept of natural selection should be reconceived in terms that bring out its 
dynamical relationships with chance and self-organization. In our view, Kauffman’s 
recent work, as expressed in The Origins of Order, does just this. 
What is involved here is a revision and extension of natural selection theory, not its negation. 
Kauffman (1995, p. 8) himself called for a ‘revision of the Darwinian worldview’ not its 
abandonment. As Kauffman (1993, p. 644) also related: 
                                                 
11 Hayek (1973, p. 23) went on to hint at generalized evolutionary principles. He distinguished between ‘the 
selection of individuals’ and ‘that of institutions and practices’ and on ‘the selection of innate rather than on 
culturally transmitted capacities of individuals.’ He thus differentiated between the selection of biological and 
social entities and then proposed that ‘the basic conception of evolution is still the same in both fields.’ 
However, to complete the picture, he should have highlighted that (according to his own account) ‘selection’ is 
central to this ‘basic conception of evolution’, and then acknowledged that the principle of selection does not 
pre-date Darwin in the manner of his more broadly and loosely defined ‘idea of evolution’.  
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I have tried to take steps toward characterizing the interaction of selection and self-
organization. … Evolution is not just ‘chance caught on the wing.’ It is not just a 
tinkering of the ad hoc, of bricolage, of contraption. It is emergent order honored and 
honed by selection. 
Kauffman’s (2000) later work on self-organization reinforces this point. Once self-
organized systems and subsystems emerge, natural selection acts upon these self-organized 
structures once they emerge. Far from being an alternative to natural selection, self-
organization requires it in order to determine which self-organized units have survival value. 
Accordingly, other self-organization theorists, such as the biologists Scott Camazine and his 
colleagues, similarly recognize that self-organization complements rather than displaces the 
‘orthodoxy’ of natural selection. Echoing Kauffman, Camazine et al. (2001, p. 89) write, 
There is no contradiction or competition between self-organization and natural selection. 
Instead, it is a cooperative ‘marriage’ in which self-organization allows tremendous 
economy in the amount of information that natural selection needs to encode in the 
genome. In this way, the study of self-organization in biological systems promotes 
orthodox evolutionary explanation, not heresy. 
Consequently, evolutionary economists who propose that self-organization theory is an 
alternative to Darwinian principles are at variance with their prominent mentors in self-
organization theory. Leading theorists of self-organization recognize that natural selection is 
required at some point in the explanation. Otherwise there is a gaping hole in the argument. 
Those that emphasize self-organization to the exclusion of selection do not explain how (self-
organized) systems are adapted to their environment. 
An exclusive focus on self-organization concentrates on the development of the entity, with 
a relative neglect of its interactions with its environment and no adequate explanation of how 
the entity comes to be adapted to survive in this environment. The predominant concern is 
with internal development and evolution from within, even to the extent of defining evolution 
in these narrow and unwarranted terms.12
On the contrary, in biology, neither individuals, species, nor ecosystems are entirely ‘self-
transforming’. Evolution takes place within open systems involving both endogenous and 
exogenously stimulated change. Generally, evolution takes place both through internal 
changes and interactions with the (possibly changing) environment. Often the environment 
changes because of migrations and intrusions from another region. As already observed by 
Darwin (1859), isolation mechanisms have important effects on the evolutionary path of eco-
systems. Isolation gives new variation time to evolve slowly, but generally reduces the level 
of new variation that is being produced. The breakdown of isolation mechanisms increases the 
level of variation present in a population, sometimes leading to the overcoming of system 
rigidities.  
In biology, much change in a given area is due to introductions of existing species from 
other regions, which interact with their new neighbors and affect the course of evolution. 
Exogenous shocks, such as meteor impacts and climate change, are also believed to have had 
                                                 
12 Witt (2003, p. 13) has repeatedly defined evolution as ‘the self-transformation over time of a system’. This is 
redolent of epigenesis and echoes similar and equally confined conceptions of evolution as primarily one of a 
system changing ‘from within’ by Marx, Schumpeter and others. On the other hand, Witt’s emphasis on the 
creation of novelty is entirely consistent with a Darwinian approach, especially when external as well as internal 
stimuli for creativity are taken into account. 
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major influence on the evolutionary process, leading to the extinction of some species and the 
expansion of others. 
Likewise, in social evolution, exogenously stimulated change is sometimes of great 
importance, partly because of the cultural mechanisms of imitation and conformism that tend 
to reduce internal variety and can lead to institutional ossification. Exogenous shocks can 
sometimes overcome the rigidity of the system. Many historical examples illustrate this, such 
as the seventeenth century revolutions in England being sparked by outside forces from 
Scotland and elsewhere. The arrival of American warships in Tokyo Bay led to the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868 and the abrupt transition of Japan from feudalism to a Western-inspired 
capitalist society. The occupation of Japan and Germany by American and allied troops in 
1945 also led to major institutional changes. The course of institutional evolution was altered 
by the intrusion of new forces across the boundaries of the system, as in many other cases of 
institutional transformation being promoted by invasion or other forces from outside. 
On its own, self-organization theory can adequately explain neither the current adaptedness 
nor the process of adaptation to the environment. Self-organization theory further leaves 
unexplained the effects of environmental changes on a population of entities. In biology, self-
organization is insufficient to address the contingent nature of life and the basic problem of 
survival and reproduction. To repeat, self-organization can help to explain how undesigned 
social orders emerge, but itself it explains neither (a) the characteristics of the agents that 
interact to create the emergent order, (b) how the emergent order reacts to competing social 
orders, nor (c) more generally how an emergent order adapts and survives in the broader 
social and natural environment. It leaves out two necessary processes of selection: that which 
led to the original population of (interacting) agents, and that which ensured that the emergent 
order adapted and survived. Indeed, such an explanation is most straightforward if we 
consider a selection process in a population of competing emergent orders. This implies that 
the capacity to adapt at the level of an individual emergent order must be explained as the 
outcome of population-level adaptation among competing emergent orders. 
As the leading biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1962, p. 16) put it, ‘No theory of 
evolution which leaves the phenomenon of adaptedness an unexplained mystery can be 
acceptable.’ Some theory of adaptation and survival is essential. Lacking such an account, 
self-organization is highly inadequate as a general, evolutionary theory. In response to the 
self-organization theorists, Gary Cziko (1995, p. 323) similarly argued, 
the laws of physics acting on nonliving entities can lead to spontaneous complexity, but 
nothing in these laws can guarantee adapted complexity of the type seen in living 
organisms … Of all the complex systems and structures that may self-organize due to the 
forces of nature, there can be no assurance that all or any of them will be of use for the 
survival and reproduction of living organisms. 
In other words, self-organization itself cannot account for the survival potential of a self-
organized system. Ideas of self-organization may help us understand the emergence of some 
pattern and order, but they cannot themselves account for the survival value of the order or 
system itself, especially when compared with rival entities or organisms. 
At this stage, in evaluating the limits of self-organization, it is useful to introduce and 
distinguish the concepts of ontogeny and phylogeny. In biology, ontogeny refers to the growth 
and development of single organisms from embryo to adult. In this case, changes in the 
genetic material or genotype are irrelevant to the explanation. Similarly, self-organization 
involves an ontogenetic evolutionary process, in that it addresses the development of a 
particular organism or structure, not the constituent elements. 
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This does not rule out the possibility that ontogeny can also involve the natural selection of 
entities within the organism. For example, the growth of many organisms involves the natural 
selection of immunities, neural patterns and (often beneficial) bacteria in their gut (Edelman 
1987, Plotkin 1994, Hull et al. 2001). Likewise, the ontogenetic growth of a firm may involve 
the internal selection of habits or routines (Nelson and Winter). Hence some descriptions of 
self-organizing processes involve some (phylogenetic) selection of constituent components of 
the emerging structure. 
However, accounts of self-organization or ontogeny do not necessarily involve selection or 
phylogeny. Phylogeny refers to the evolutionary history of a group of organisms, such as a 
species. By definition, phylogeny means the existence and evolution of a whole population 
within which selection occurs. In a phylogenetic process the genetic material in the whole 
population changes. Natural selection is always phylogenetic as well as ontogenetic, in that it 
addresses the evolution of whole populations of organisms or structures as well as the 
development of individual organisms. In general, ontogeny may but does not necessarily 
incorporate phylogeny; but phylogeny always incorporates ontogeny. The status of the two 
concepts is thus unequal, as phylogeny is more general than ontogeny.13
From the point of view of the overall evolutionary process, complete evolutionary 
descriptions require a phylogenetic account of the selection of ontogenetically developing 
units. Hence while self-organization is important (and perhaps essential), it cannot provide a 
complete evolutionary description. This must involve phylogeny as well as ontogeny. If we 
are confined to ontogeny then our description of the overall evolutionary process is 
incomplete; it does not address the differential survival and fecundity of different (self-
organized) structures or organisms. Consequently, self-organization may be an important part 
of evolution and ontogenetic development, but it cannot replace natural selection. 
Self-organization theorists have shown how complex structures can emerge without design, 
but these structures are themselves subject to evolutionary selection. Some will survive longer 
and be more influential than others: selection will operate. We have every reason to see these 
issues as relevant to economic evolution. Conscious choices, competitive pressures, market 
forces or environmental constraints operate on habits, customs, technologies, institutions, 
regions and even whole economies. Many of these contain self-organized structures, but this 
neither precludes nor demotes the role of evolutionary selection. 
Furthermore, some processes of self-organization may themselves depend on past selection. 
An often cited example is the ribosome: when the parts are introduced, the structure snaps 
into place. But the shapes of the components that fit together are the result of past selection; 
some parts fail to self-assemble when structure-altering mutations are introduced. Self-
organization may depend on both anterior and posterior processes of selection. 
3. Can Darwinism cope with intentionality? 
                                                 
13 The status of phylogeny versus ontogeny has been the source of much dispute in biology (Baguñà and 
Garcia-Fernàndez 2003, Gilbert et al. 1996), commonly known as the evo-devo debate. According to a number 
of developmental biologists, a new synthesis of evolutionary biology and developmental biology (evo-devo 
synthesis) is called for because, in their own words, ‘macroevolutionary questions, are not seen as being soluble 
by population genetics, and the developmental actions of genes involved with growth and cell specification are 
seen as being critical for the formation of higher taxa’ (Gilbert et al. p. 357). Such proponents view ontogeny as 
more important than phylogeny. Nevertheless, even if phylogeny it is less important, development requires both 
phylogeny and ontogeny (Stadler et al. 2001). 
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A widespread accusation against the Darwinian account of evolution is that it is ‘blind’. More 
specifically, some authors interpret the alleged ‘blindness’ of Darwinian evolution to mean 
that it assumes that organisms, including humans, act as if they are fumbling in the dark with 
little conception of what they are doing or where they are going.  
Darwin did not treat humans as if they were incapable of self-reflection, reason, foresight, 
purpose or planning. Such attributes are neither irrelevant nor entirely absent in the non-
human animal world. As Darwin (1859, p. 208) wrote: ‘A little dose … of judgment or reason 
often comes into play, even in animals very low in the scale of nature.’ As Darwin (1871, vol. 
1, p. 46) repeated elsewhere: ‘animals possess some power of reasoning. Animals may 
constantly be seen to pause, deliberate and resolve.’ As he believed that animals had powers 
of reasoning, then he would hardly have belittled or denied them for humans. 
Nevertheless there are other senses in which evolution may be blind. One sense in which 
Darwinian evolution is blind is the same as the sense in which self-organization is blind, that 
particular outcomes are not necessarily prefigured or predicted in advance: design emerges 
without a seeing designer (Vanberg 2004). This should not be taken to mean that individual 
agents or organisms within the system are necessarily unable to prefigure or plan their own 
actions. Another sense in which Darwinian evolution is blind, even in the human domain, is 
stressed by Donald T. Campbell (1987) who argues that any effective capacity for foresight or 
prescience must be based on tried and tested knowledge, otherwise we have no grounds to 
presume its effectiveness. Accordingly when genuine innovations are launched, we are unable 
to assess the probability of their success or failure. In this sense, all genuine novelties and 
innovations are blind. Again this does not undermine the reality or importance of human 
deliberation, intention, foresight or creativity. 
In a related objection to the application of Darwinian principles to social evolution, the 
economist John R. Commons (1924, 1934) repeatedly proposed that institutional evolution 
involves ‘artificial’ rather than ‘natural’ selection. As Commons acknowledged, Darwin 
himself established the idea of artificial selection, which occurs when a human breeder selects 
strains of a plant or animal according to favored attributes for further propagation. 
The essential characteristic of artificial selection is that humans manipulate the criteria or 
environment of selection; the selection process is under the control of a human agent. 
However, it would be a misunderstanding to see artificial selection as an alternative to natural 
selection. Darwin did not propose that ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ selection are mutually 
exclusive. On the contrary, he used artificial selection as an exemplar for natural selection. 
Furthermore, at a high level of abstraction, artificial and natural selection share an identical 
definition (Hull 1988, Price 1995, Knudsen 2004). 
Crucially, the human doing the selection is also a product of natural evolution. The 
dispositions, aims and criteria that humans use in selecting specimens for ‘artificial’ selection 
are also the products of processes of cognitive and cultural evolution. The phenomenon of 
humans selecting between outcomes or possibilities is important and real, but their 
preferences and choices have also, as far as possible, to be explained. 
When ‘artificial selection’ does take place, it is not the end of the story. Different 
institutions or societies in which artificial selection is involved sometimes compete against 
each other. Hence some additional processes of evolutionary selection may be involved. 
Sometimes despite human intentions, some institutions will survive while others may not. 
Natural events or other forces may influence the selection outcome. Any outcome of 
‘artificial’ selection has to be tested in the environment. Artificial selection cannot replace or 
demote a broader concept of evolutionary selection in human society.  
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The compartmentalization of artificial from natural selection sometimes relies on a notion 
of intention as something distinct and separate from the multiple causal linkages of nature. 
Intentions are real and have effects. Nevertheless, intentions themselves are caused. 
According to Darwin’s ontological outlook, everything must submit to a causal explanation in 
scientific terms. Darwinism does not exclude deliberative and calculative behavior. On the 
contrary, Darwin insisted that calculations and intentions had to be explained. 
Intentionality would have little bite unless it was guided by prior knowledge and 
experience, which in turn is necessarily shaped by the individual’s habits and instincts. Thus, 
in order to explain why decision-makers intend particular outcomes, why they sometimes 
continue to intend particular outcomes despite negative feedback, and why systematic errors 
often continue to lead to unintended and unwanted outcomes, it is important to understand 
how intentions build upon prior habits and instincts.  
In the social sciences, it is often still taken for granted that the existence of a human 
intentionality is sufficient to explain human action, without probing the causes behind 
intentions themselves. Darwinism does not deny belief, choice, purposeful behavior or 
foresight: it simply asserts that they too are caused and worthy of explanation. Indeed, 
Darwinism has an important role in explaining how agents formulate and revise goals, how 
agents generate new alternatives and why goal-directed behavior very often leads to failure.14
4. The Lamarckian confusion 
Many social scientists have described social evolution as ‘Lamarckian’. Typically this notion 
is not defined carefully, and it is often counter-posed to Darwinism. Sometimes it is 
associated with the idea that evolution is driven by will or purpose. However, Jean-Baptiste 
de Lamarck (like Darwin) was a philosophical materialist and saw intention or volition as 
rooted in material causes (Boesiger 1974). Instead it was later ‘Lamarckians’ that made 
unexplained will or purpose so central to a depiction of evolutionary change.15
Still Lamarck and the Lamarckians had something important in common: they all believed 
in the inheritance of acquired characters. Darwin (1859, pp. 82, 137, 209) never denied a 
limited role for the inheritance of acquired characters, and in his later life he gave it increasing 
rather than decreasing attention and approval. Hence Lamarckism (in this sense) and Darwin’s 
doctrine are not necessarily mutually exclusive. We now know that the possibility of the 
inheritance of acquired characters is non-existent or highly limited at the level of genetic 
evolution.16 In contrast, it has been argued by many that acquired characters can be passed on 
and inherited in the social domain. 
                                                 
14 This point has recently been acknowledged by some economists who have begun to explore the Darwinian 
basis of tastes and preferences relevant for labor markets and consumption choices (Rubin and Somanathan 
1998). 
15 The idea that Lamarck’s theory necessarily involves organisms willing their own adaptations probably 
emanates from an 1830 caricature of Lamarck’s views by G. Cuvier (Richards 1987, p. 63). It does not derive 
from Lamarck himself (Burkhardt 1984, pp. xxx-xxxi). 
16 There is a minority view among biologists that the inheritance of acquired characters may be possible in a 
restricted set of circumstances, such as the transfer of acquired immunities from mother to child (Steele 1979, Ho 
- 12 - 
Three working definitions of Darwinism, Lamarckism and Weismannism17 (or neo-
Darwinism) are suggested below: 
• Darwinism is a causal theory of evolution in complex population systems involving 
the inheritance of generative instructions by individual units and a process of selection 
of the varied population of such entities. 
• Lamarckism is a doctrine admitting the possibility of the (genotypic) inheritance of 
acquired (phenotypic) characters by individual organisms in evolutionary processes. 
• Weismannism (or neo-Darwinism) is a doctrine denying the possibility of the 
(genotypic) inheritance of acquired (phenotypic) characters by individual organisms in 
evolutionary processes. 
Note first that the first two (Darwinism and Lamarckism) are not mutually exclusive, whereas 
Lamarckism is the opposite of Weismannism and one denies the other. Not only is the 
relationship between Lamarckism and Darwinism asymmetrical, but also they involve 
different degrees of explanatory completeness: there are gaps in the Lamarckian story. In 
particular, if acquired characters can be inherited, what is to prevent the inheritance of 
acquired injuries or impairments? If every acquired characteristic were inherited, then every 
newborn human would be aged and wrinkled like its parents. There must be a mechanism that 
allows beneficial characters to be inherited, but reduces the probability of inheriting injuries 
or other acquired impairments. The only plausible mechanism is natural selection itself. 
Accordingly, Lamarckism depends on the Darwinian principle of selection in order to explain 
why any disastrous propensity to inherit acquired impairments does not prevail. As Richard 
Dawkins (1986, p. 300) argues, ‘the Lamarckian theory can explain adaptive improvement in 
evolution only by, as it were, riding on the back of the Darwinian theory.’ Consequently 
Lamarckism, if valid in any particular domain, depends on Darwinian mechanisms of 
selection for evolutionary guidance. By contrast, Darwinism has a broader applicability and 
remains valid in spheres where Lamarckian inheritance does not occur. Even if it is valid, then 
Lamarckism requires Darwinism as an explanatory crutch. 
Insofar as organisms are purposeful, this capacity too has evolved through natural selection. 
Darwinism thus points to an evolutionary explanation of the very origin of will of purpose 
itself. Hence overall, Darwinism is a more general and powerful theory than Lamarckism. If 
social evolution can be legitimately described as Lamarckian in the sense of admitting the 
possibility of inheritance of acquired characters, then this Lamarckism must be nested within 
a Darwinian theory. 
Accordingly, Lamarckism is not an alternative to Darwinism, even in the social sphere. It is 
erroneous to see them as rivals because Lamarckism depends on Darwinian natural selection 
to complete its explanations. Hence Witt (1999, p. 288) and many others are wrong to 
presume that social learning and social evolution are ‘more akin to Lamarckian than to 
Darwinian evolution.’ There is nothing in social evolution that contradicts the core Darwinian 
principles, and these general principles do not themselves exclude the possibility of acquired 
character inheritance. Even if we can talk of acquired characters being inherited in the social 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Saunders 1984, Jablonka et al. 1992, Steele et al. 1998). We entirely abstain from evaluating these minority 
arguments in biology, and our arguments are unaffected by either their validity or their falsehood. 
17 Named after the German Darwinian biologist August Weismann (1893) who proposed strong empirical and 
theoretical arguments against the possibility of acquired character inheritance in the biological domain. 
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domain, then this does not undermine the greater explanatory importance of Darwin’s 
theory.18
5. Why Darwinism is not enough 
It is argued above that complex population systems are found in both nature and the human 
social world. Furthermore, their evolution involves some shared Darwinian principles. It is 
not that social evolution is analogous to evolution in the natural world; it is that at a high level 
of abstraction, social and biological evolution share these general principles. In this sense, 
social evolution is Darwinian. 
This proposition might provoke the accusation that it ignores the big differences between 
the mechanisms of social and biological evolution. Of course, they are hugely dissimilar in all 
sorts of details. Nothing corresponds closely in the social domain to DNA, sexual 
recombination and much else. Social units such as routines and institutions can change much 
more rapidly than human DNA, and they replicate by very different mechanisms. But 
Darwinism is more general and is not tied to these particulars. Indeed, not all biological 
replication is sexual, biparental or via DNA. Furthermore, not all biological evolution is slow: 
some bacteria evolve quickly, and very rapid biological replication and mutation can occur 
with viruses.19
Accordingly, Witt (2004, p. 128) is mistaken in his characterization that a universal or 
generalized Darwinism ‘supposes that there is only one and the same ontological basis for all 
evolutionary phenomena’. While the biological and the social are different levels of the same 
world, the detailed ontology of (say) genes is different from the detailed ontology of (say) the 
immune system, and both are very different from the detailed ontology of the human social 
world. A generalized Darwinism proposes that despite these real and severe ontological 
differences at the level of detail, there are also nevertheless common ontological features at an 
abstract level. Precisely because it abstracts from the detailed ontological differences, a 
generalized Darwinism cannot explain everything. 
To say that two sets of phenomena are similar in general terms does not imply that they are 
similar in detailed respects. Mice and elephants are both mammals, but they differ greatly in 
size, behavior and lifespan. Steam engines and internal combustion engines are very different 
in mechanics and performance, but they are both carbon fuelled heat engines subject to the 
laws of thermodynamics. Pebbles and planets are also highly dissimilar, but their trajectories 
through space can both be calculated adequately by means of Newton’s laws of motion. 
Not only do natural and social evolution differ greatly in their details, but also detailed 
mechanisms differ greatly within the biological world. Biological organisms differ 
enormously in size, lifespan and reproductive fertility. Some species are social, others not. 
Haploid and diploid organisms have single and paired chromosomes respectively, and their 
mechanisms of reproduction differ in many ways. An even more fundamental difference is 
between prokaryotes (no cell nucleus) and eukaryotes (nucleated). The reproduction and 
                                                 
18 Furthermore, as elaborated elsewhere, there are general problems in the use of the ‘Lamarckian’ description in 
the social domain (Hull 1982, 1988, Hodgson and Knudsen, 2005). 
19 Gould (2002) has long argued that the rate of evolution of given lineages is far from uniform, being 
‘punctuated’ by bursts of relatively rapid evolutionary change. 
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selection of immunities and neural patterns involve very different processes, and these in turn 
are different from replication and selection of DNA, but all of these are subject to Darwinian 
principles (Edelman 1987, Darden and Cain 1989, Plotkin 1994, Hull et al. 2001). As well as 
through seeds, some plants can reproduce by lateral root-sprouts or suckers, cloning a similar 
and independent plant with identical DNA. Generally, replication among invertebrates is very 
different from that among vertebrates. And so on.  
The differences of mechanism within the biological world are as impressive in some ways 
as the differences between the biological and the social. Accordingly, the generalization of the 
Darwinian principles within biology yields propositions of significance far beyond biology 
itself, encompassing the very different and itself intrinsically diverse world of social 
evolution. As David Hull (1988, p. 403) puts it, ‘the amount of increased generality needed to 
accommodate the full range of biological phenomena turns out to be extensive enough to 
include social and conceptual evolution as well.’ 
The ongoing attempts of evolutionary biologists to understand the variety within the natural 
world offer lessons for the evolutionary social scientist. It is not to copy slavishly all ideas 
from the biological to the social domain. It is instead to appreciate the evolving panorama of 
evolutionary theory in its attempts to explore and understand this complexity, while retaining 
Darwin’s three general principles at the core. The issues are far from settled in evolutionary 
biology (Stadler et al. 2001), but most agree about the centrality of the Darwinian principles 
of variation, inheritance and selection. 
Given that Darwinism operates at a relatively high degree of generality, it cannot itself give 
an account of all the details, in either the social or the biological sphere. Darwinism does not 
provide a complete theory of everything, from cells to human society. Darwinism provides an 
over-arching framework of explanation, but without claiming to explain every aspect or 
detail. In insisting that evolution was always dependent on its specific context, Darwin (1859, 
p. 314) declared: ‘I believe in no fixed law of development.’ 
Crucially, explanations additional to natural selection are always required to explain any 
evolved phenomenon. For example, natural selection alone cannot explain why some birds 
have dull, and others colorful, plumage. Different auxiliary explanations are required, such as 
camouflage against predators in some cases, or competition for mates and sexual selection in 
others. Selection is the general principle, but it operates in different ways. Even in biology 
there is an important difference between predator selection and sexual selection. Natural 
selection does not itself induce variability at the individual level, and additional theories are 
required to explain this. The sources of variation are very different in different contexts. The 
general Darwinian principle of variation applies, but it does not itself explain how variation 
occurs. 
Accordingly, the transfer of Darwinian principles from biological to social evolution does 
not imply that the detailed mechanisms of selection, variation and inheritance are similar. On 
the contrary, the important differences between and within the two spheres suggest that the 
details are very different, and there are bound to be many detailed mechanisms in the social 
world that are not found in biology. Consequently, the application of general Darwinian 
principles cannot do all the explanatory work for the social scientist. Darwinism alone is not 
enough. 
Therefore Witt (2004, p. 141) is right to insist that ‘the mechanisms and regularities of 
cultural evolution differ fundamentally from those of natural evolution. Darwinian theory is 
therefore not sufficient to explain them.’ But the insufficiency of a theoretical approach does 
not itself deny its necessity. Darwinism is insufficient, but we have argued above that it is also 
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necessary at an abstract and highly general level. The very generality of Darwinism hints at a 
multiple-level mode of theorizing in complex population systems (Hodgson 2001).20
The Darwinian framework has a high degree of generality, and it always requires specific 
auxiliary explanations. The meta-theoretical framework of Darwinism provides a way of 
inspiring, framing and organizing these explanations (Darden and Cain 1989, Blute 1997, 
Hodgson 2001). To repeat, this commitment to a general Darwinian framework does not 
overlook the important differences between the specific mechanisms of evolution in biology 
and in society. On the contrary, Darwinism always requires further explanations of the 
particular mechanisms that occur in specific cases. In any relevant domain, Darwinian theory 
points to a combination of over-arching general principles and much more specific and 
detailed explanations as a means of understanding evolution in complex systems. Indeed, it is 
the only general framework that has been devised to deal with the complex population 
systems that have been described above. But, to repeat, it is never sufficient on its own. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
In generalizing Darwinism to social evolution, we are addressing populations of social entities 
such as customs, rules, routines, and institutions. The notion of self-organization may be very 
important in helping to explain in some cases how individual entities develop, but we still 
require a Darwinian theory to begin to explain the evolution of the whole population of such 
entities. Self-organization alone cannot explain the adaptation and differential survival of self-
organized outcomes. 
Human intentionality is very important in the social sphere. Humans have unique capacities 
for prefiguration and deliberation. Human social interaction also involves the imputation of 
such powers to others with whom we interact. There is nothing in Darwinism that excludes or 
belittles human intentionality, prefiguration, deliberation, and choice. What Darwinism 
requires is that they too should be subject to causal explanation. 
Concerning the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics, most biologists reject 
such a possibility in the biological domain, and the Lamarckian description is itself 
problematic. Even if acquired character inheritance did occur on another planet or in social 
evolution, it would not rule out Darwinism, which is necessary to explain why acquired 
impairments or injuries are not inherited. Darwinism and Lamarckism are neither rivals nor 
opposites. If Lamarckian inheritance did occur, then Darwinian principles would be required 
to complete its explanations. Hence the case for the use of the ‘Darwinian’ label is much 
stronger than the ‘Lamarckian’ one, even in the social context. 
In sum, as long as we are addressing a population of replicating entities, then social 
evolution must be Darwinian, whether or not self-organization, human intentionality, or 
Lamarckian inheritance are involved. As long as there is a population of replicating entities 
with varying capacities to survive, then Darwinian evolution will occur. 
                                                 
20 As noted above, Witt (1997, p. 489) upholds that the ‘theory of self-organization … provides an abstract, 
general description of evolutionary processes.’ We argue that it is not sufficiently general to deal with the 
features of adaptation and selection. But leaving that on one side, Witt’s proclamation of such a ‘general 
description’ is vulnerable to his own objection (to a generalized Darwinism) that such generalities ignore the 
vital differences between self-organization in the natural and the social world. He (wrongly) regards this 
objection to be crucial against a generalized Darwinism, but fails to deploy it against his favored general theory 
of self-organization. 
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Social evolution deals with populations of entities, including customs and social 
institutions, that compete for scarce resources. Accordingly, we believe that social evolution 
is Darwinian. This is not essentially a matter of analogy; it is a partial description and analysis 
of reality. Social evolution is Darwinian by virtue of (social) ontology, not (biological) 
analogy.  
However, the ontological case for extending Darwinism to social evolution refers to very 
broad ontological communalities, not to matters of detail. To repeat: biological evolution and 
social evolution are very different with regard to details. Nevertheless, Darwinian modes of 
explanation are necessary to address the ontologies of evolving populations, in both the 
biological and the social domains. 
However, the notion of a generalized Darwinism itself provides no alternative to a detailed 
explanation of the particular emergent properties and processes at the social or biological 
levels. Darwinism does not itself provide all the necessary causal mechanisms and 
explanations for the social scientist, nor obviate the elaborate additional work of specific 
investigation and detailed causal explanation in the social sphere (Hodgson 2001).  
Darwinism is unavoidable but this does not mean that the core Darwinian theory is 
sufficient to explain the processes of social evolution. Darwinian principles provide a general 
explanatory framework into which particular explanations and empirical details have to be 
placed (Hull 1973). A generalized Darwinism cannot itself give us a full, detailed explanation 
of evolutionary processes or outcomes. It is more a meta-theoretical framework than a 
complete theory. For the evolutionary social sciences, as elsewhere, Darwinian general 
principles are necessary but not sufficient. 
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